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THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF STUDENTS AT CENTER
STAGE: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN SCHOOL-SPONSORED
PLAYS
INTRODUCTION
In Seyfried v. Walton,1 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit affirmed a decision of the District Court of Dela-
ware, which held that the first amendment rights of students in-
volved in a high school production of the Broadway musical Pip-
pin were not violated when the school superintendent cancelled
the play in mid-rehearsal. The most significant aspect of the two
opinions is the use of a broad "course curriculum" theory to avoid
reliance on the substantial precedent available in library book re-
moval and student press cases.2 Content regulation of a school-
sponsored play could potentially be seen as both an unwarranted
deviation from current students' rights case law and as an omen of
further judicial encroachment on the rights of this group in the
years to come. Indeed, in the months following the district court's
decision, controversies similar to that in Seyfried emerged in sev-
eral communities, with such varied works as Inherit the Wind,
One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest, Godspell, and Grease falling
prey to the discretion of school officials.
The Seyfried case arose in the setting of a Delaware high
1. 512 F. Supp. 235 (D. Del. 1981), aff'd, 668 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1982).
2. The significance of Seyfried has been recognized in the entertainment world. Vari-
ety, the trade newspaper, reported in a front page article that "[Seyfried] may establish a
precedent, because while District Court records list many student freedom-of-speech cases
which concerned the choice of school books and curriculum, to date no reported decision has
been found in which the choice of a play was at issue." Variety, Apr. 8, 1981, at 1, col. 1. A
follow-up story on January 27, 1982 included the prediction that "[f]or now, the 'Pippin'
case will serve as the benchmark for what is expected to be an increasing number of play-
selection controversies." Variety, Jan. 27, 1982, at 94, col. 5.
3. In its coverage of the Third Circuit ruling in Seyfried, Variety noted that "[t]he
issue of whether a public school play can be cancelled without infringing on the First
Amendment rights of students, teachers and the community has erupted in several commu-
nities even as Federal courts ruled on the first such case ever to come before them." Variety,
Jan. 27, 1982, at 87, col. 4. The article goes on to describe cancellations of an eighth-grade
production of Inherit the Wind in Maryland, and high school productions of One Flew Over
the Cuckoo's Nest, Godspell, and Grease, in Maryland, Delaware and Iowa, respectively.
Lawsuits are contemplated in the two Maryland situations. See infra notes 170-71.
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school which, each year, sponsored a theatrical production. The
school district had no set policy regarding selection of the play to
be performed, and had always left the choice to the director of the-
ater. For the spring 1981 production, the direptor selected Pippin,
feeling that it could be edited and staged in a way that would
make it appropriate for presentation on a high school stage.'
Before modifications had been made, a parent read the script and
complained to the school board president that portions of the work
mocked God and prayer.5 The president relayed this complaint to
the district superintendent, who, after reading the unmodified
script and conferring with two staff members who had seen other
productions of Pippin, decided to cancel the school production.
The superintendent asserted that he objected, not to the play's ref-
erences to religion, but to its sexual suggestiveness." At a meeting
where the school board heard the views of interested parents, four
spoke in favor of presenting Pippin, one against, and the board
declined to intervene in the matter. Several students and their par-
ents then filed suit against the superintendent, members of the
board, and the school district itself, alleging abridgement of the
plaintiffs' first amendment rights and seeking injunctive, declara-
tory and monetary relief.'
In order to gain proper perspective on the issue at hand in
Seyfried, reference must be made to federal court decisions both
within and outside the school context. Part I of this Comment ex-
amines "adult" first amendment and prior restraint law as applied
to theatrical productions. Part II reviews the concept of "academic
4. The director thought that Pippin, as originally and ordinarily produced, would not
be appropriate for a high school production. Seyfried, 512 F. Supp. at 236.
5. When the superintendent reviewed the play, "he did not find that it mocked God or
prayer; but rather that it mocked people who were 'hypocritical' about their religion," Id.
6. Specifically, two scenes bothered the superintendent. The first was scene four where
Pippin's grandmother sings of the joys of the flesh (in the most innocuous manner possible-
ed.). The song is followed by a dance sequence where, according to the stage directions, all
the boys and girls became involved and begin to show Pippin every possible form of sexual
activity. The director's version retained scene four, but toned down the dance sequence. Her
annotated script indicated that the dancers will "entice" Pippin, but in a "tasteful" manner.
See id. at 237.
The second was scene seven where, in the director's version, Pippin and the widow Cath-
erine embrace and then walk offstage holding hands. The superintendent's objection was
that "in the context of the remainder of the play, it is implicit that they have experienced
physical intimacy." Id.
7. Id. at 235-36.
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freedom," and the application of this concept to cases addressing
the removal of library books and restraints on student press. Fi-
nally, Part III discusses the approach actually followed by the
courts in Seyfried; the exercise of deference to school board judg-
ment in matters purportedly involving course curriculum. The
principal conclusion arising from this analysis is that the Seyfried
courts, by applying the curriculum rationale in a conclusory and
shortsighted fashion, improperly skirted important freedom of
speech considerations.'
I. ADULT LAW PRECEDENT-SEYFRIED CONSIDERED OUTSIDE THE
SCHOOL CONTEXT
First amendment rights within the school context do not stand
in total isolation from first amendment rights in general. On the
contrary, numerous courts adjudicating disputes arising in an aca-
demic environment have directed their attention to constitutional
principles developed in non-educational situations.9 Therefore, it is
appropriate here to initially set forth the status of adult law re-
garding restraints placed on theatrical productions.
A. The First Amendment
The United States Supreme Court has recently reiterated the
well-established constitutional tenet that "entertainment as well as
political and ideological speech" is protected by thd first amend-
ment.10 Thus, the guarantee of free speech extends to such diverse
art forms as motion pictures,11 music,1 2 and sculpture. 13 When the
government imposes a restraint upon protected artistic expression,
the regulation "may not be affected by sympathy or hostility for
the point of view being expressed by the communicator. '1 4
Nearly three decades ago, Justice Douglas, in a concurring
8. This Comment does not address the issue of the presentation of religious pageants
and the like in public schools. For a full discussion of that issue, see Jackson, Christmas
Carols in School Assemblies May Be Constitutional, 31 MERCER L. REv. 627 (1980); Swan-
son, Accommodating Religion in the Public Schools, 59 Na. L. REv. 425 (1980).
9. See infra note 175.
10. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 97 (1981).
11. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
12. Goldstein v. Town of Nantucket, 477 F. Supp. 606 (D. Mass. 1979).
13. Sefick v. City of Chicago, 485 F. Supp. 644 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
14. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 67, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 873
(1976).
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opinion, declared that every writer, actor or producer in the nation,
regardless of his medium of expression, "should be freed from the
censor."1 5 As to live theater, this notion achieved full recognition
in the 1970's with a series of cases concerning the denial of the use
of municipal auditorium facilities to the promoters of the rock mu-
sical Hair.16 The series culminated in the Supreme Court's decision
in Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad ,'1 the chief adult law
precedent relied upon by the plaintiffs in Seyfried. Implicit in all
of the Hair cases is the concept that a musical production is enti-
tled to first amendment protection."" The rationale behind this
concept is clear-"live theatrical productions . . . are media and
organs for the expression of public opinion and the propagation of
ideas and critical comments."' 9
It has been suggested that the alleged "non-speech" elements
of plays-for example, in Hair, the appearance of nude actors and
the use of an American flag to wrap around an actor-are not pro-
tected by the first amendment.20 The basis for this allegation is the
warning extended by the Supreme Court in United States v.
O'Brien-' that "when 'speech' and 'non-speech' elements are com-
bined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important gov-
ernmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify
incidental limitations on first amendment freedoms. ' 22 Courts
have refused to apply this analysis to theatrical productions, hold-
ing instead that a musical play must be treated as "a unitary form
of constitutionally protected expression. '23
15. Superior Films, Inc. v. Department of Educ., 346 U.S. 587, 589 (1954). See also
Schact v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970). Schact held unconstitutional a statute which
allowed an actor to wear a military uniform only if "the portrayal does not tend to discredit
that armed force." Id. at 63. The Court noted, "[a]n actor, like everyone else in our country,
enjoys a constitutional right to freedom of speech, including the right openly to criticize the
Government during a dramatic performance." Id. at 69.
16. See, e.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. City of West Palm Beach, 457 F.2d 1016
(5th Cir. 1972); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. City of Mobile, 457 F.2d 340 (5th Cir.
1972); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. City of Atlanta, 334 F. Supp. 634 (N.D. Ga. 1971);
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. City of Charlotte, 333 F. Supp. 345 (W.D.N.C. 1971).
17. 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
18. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. City of Mobile, 457 F.2d at 341.
19. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. City of Atlanta, 334 F. Supp. at 638.
20. Id. The City of Atlanta set forth this argument but it failed to persuade the Georgia
District Court.
21. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
22. Id. at 376.
23. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. City of Atlanta, 334 F. Supp. at 639.
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Although the right to freedom of speech clearly encompasses
stage presentations, the first amendment is not without limita-
tions; reasonable regulations as to the time, place and manner of
speech are permissible.2" In addition, libel,25 obscenity,26 incite-
ment,27 and expression directed at a "captive audience ' 2 are un-
protected. Of these four exceptions, obscenity stands out as the
charge most likely to be levelled against a theatrical production.28
In Miller v. California,0 the Supreme Court declared that material
is obscene when it appeals to prurient interests, depicts sexual con-
duct in a patently offensive manner, and lacks serious literary, ar-
tistic, political or scientific value.3 1 This test creates a formidable
barrier to finding that any given stage play is obscene, and, indeed,
a survey of post-Miller federal case law reveals no instance where a
court so branded a play.3 2 In Conrad the majority refused to even
24. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972).
25. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
26. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
27. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
28. E.g., Gambino v. Fairfax County School Bd., 429 F. Supp. 731, 735 (E.D. Va. 1977)
(quoting Brandeis, J., in Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105, 110 (1932)) (communication
constantly before observers on the streets and in street cars is seen without their choice or
volition).
29. The rigid proof requirements in libel cases, particularly those involving public offi-
cials or public figures, render it extremely difficult to establish the libelous nature of a play.
Likewise, while Diaghliev's production of "The Rites of Spring" may have sparked riots in
early twentieth century Russia, it is hardly likely that a theatrical presentation could incite
violent activity in the more sedate atmosphere of late twentieth century America. The cap-
tive audience exception is, of course, inapplicable to a play, for which people knowingly
purchase tickets and attend voluntarily.
30. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
31. The Miller obscenity test fully stated is:
(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary standards, would
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interests...;
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sex-
ual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, politi-
cal or scientific value.
Id. at 24 (citations omitted).
32. Even where vehement charges of obscenity have been levelled against particular
films, the strong judicial bias against prior restraint remains. Thus, in United States v.
Tupler, 564 F.2d 1294, 1297 (1977), the Ninth Circuit stated, "First Amendment protection
of allegedly obscene material includes the requirement that no seizure warrant be issued
without a procedure 'designed to focus searchingly upon the question of obscenity.'" For a
recent Supreme Court opinion indicating the impropriety of prior restraint of allegedly ob-
scene films, see Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., Inc., 445 U.S. 308 (1980).
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address the obscenity issue. 3
B. Prior Restraint
The Supreme Court in Conrad not only recognized the attach-
ment of first amendment rights to participants in theatrical pro-
ductions, but took a significant further step and labelled the defen-
dants' rejection of the plaintiffs' application to perform Hair a
"prior restraint."3 As the Court noted, the perils of allowing pub-
lic officials to deny use of a forum in advance of actual expressions
are particularly frightening in the context of a play.3  Until the
play is performed, these officials cannot possibly know what the
method of presentation will be, let alone judge the propriety
thereof. The nonverbal element in drama-precisely what distin-
guishes this form of art from literature"--renders it difficult to
predict the nature and tone of the production, and therefore dan-
gerous to base a restraint upon such prediction.
The theoretical underpinnings of the law of prior restraint
may be found in the strong American aversion to censorship.3 7
While the phrase may not serve as a "talismanic test,"38 automati-
33. We need not decide whether the standard of obscenity applied by respondents
or the court below was sufficiently precise or substantially correct, or whether
the production is in fact obscene .... The standard, whatever it may be, must
be implemented under a system that assures prompt judicial review with a mini-
mal restriction of First Amendment rights necessary under the circumstances.
420 U.S. at 562 (citations omitted).
34. Id. at 552. According to the facts relied on by the Court, members of the Chatta-
nooga municipal board charged with managing a city auditorium and a city-leased theater
rejected a promoter's application to perform Hair on the basis of outside reports from which
it was concluded that the production would not be in "the best interest of the community."
None of the board members had seen the play or read the script, but they understood that
the work involved nudity and obscenity on the stage. Id. at 548.
35. "The perils of prior restraint are well-illustrated by this case, where neither the
Board nor the lower courts could have known precisely the extent of nudity or simulated sex
in the musical, or even that either would appear, before the play was actually performed,"
Id. at 561.
36. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. City of Atlanta, 334 F. Supp. at 639.
37. [A] theory deeply etched in our law: a free society prefers to punish the few
who abuse rights of speech after they break the law than to throttle them and all
others beforehand. It is always difficult to know in advance what an individual
will say, and the line between legitimate and illegitimate speech is often so finely
drawn that the risks of freewheeling censorship are formidable.
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. at 559 (emphasis in original).
38. Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 49 (1961).
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cally signalling a first amendment violation, 9 courts acknowledge
that "[a]ny system of prior restraints comes . ... bearing a heavy
presumption against its constitutional validity."40 The restraint
cannot be upheld if there are reasonable alternatives available
which entail less infringement on first amendment freedoms.41
Moreover, a system of prior restraints will be struck down unless
"it takes place under procedural safeguards designed to obviate the
dangers of a censorship system. '42
This procedural requirement emerged as the central concern
in Conrad. There, the Supreme Court announced that a system of
prior restraints is permissible only where it shifts the burden of
instituting judicial proceedings and the burden of proof to the cen-
sor, specifies a brief period for which the restraint may be imposed,
and assures a final judicial determination.43 Conrad strongly im-
plied that a system incorporating "narrow, objective and definite
standards, '44 along with the appropriate procedural safeguards,
might justify prior restraint of a dramatic production. However,
the dearth of prior restraint cases in the theatrical context subse-
quent to Conrad suggests that public officials have, in recent years,
carefully avoided allowing their feelings about a play's content to
enter into the decision to deny use of municipal auditorium
facilities.
C. Application of Adult Law to Seyfried
There can be little doubt that if Seyfried had been decided
under adult first amendment and prior restraint law, the defen-
39. The Court has not held that prior restraints are unconstitutional per se. See Ban-
tam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 n.10 (1964). But cf. Freedman v. Maryland, 380
U.S. 51, 61-62 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring in the result) (no censorship-no matter how
speedy or prolonged it may be-is acceptable).
40. Bantam Books, 372 U.S. at 70.
41. See, e.g., Rosen v. Port of Portland, 641 F.2d 1243, 1250 (9th Cir. 1981) (any prior
restraint should be held unconstitutional unless no other choice exists).
42. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58.
43. [A] system of prior restraint runs afoul of the First Amendment if it lacks
certain safeguards: First, the burden of instituting judicial proceedings, and of
proving that the material is unprotected, must rest on the censor. Second, any
restraint prior to judicial review can be imposed only for a specified brief period
and only for the purpose of preserving the status quo. Third, a prompt final
judicial determination must be assured.
420 U.S. at 560.
44. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. City of West Palm Beach, 457 F.2d at 1020.
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dants would have been enjoined from halting production of the
play. The superintendent might have met the demands of this
body of law had he acted under the authority of a written policy
which shifted the burden of initiating judicial proceedings and the
burden of proof to the school officials, stipulated a strict time limit
for the duration of the restraint, and guaranteed a prompt final
judicial determination. Instead, he did not act pursuant to a policy,
written or otherwise, and exercised the kind of "unfettered discre-
tion to regulate . . . the bill of fare ' 45 which the courts found re-
pugnant in the Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. line of cases.
II. STUDENT LAW PRECEDENT-SEYFRIED CONSIDERED WITHIN THE
SCHOOL CONTEXT
While it is permissible for a court to consider adult law prece-
dent in deciding a case involving the constitutional rights of stu-
dents, such precedent certainly cannot serve as the sole basis for
any decision reached. Public education systems have traditionally
received distinct treatment in American law.46 Consequently, any
case arising in the school context must be examined in light of
prior holdings in this specialized area of the law. This section eval-
uates the results of students' rights litigation and applies these re-
sults to the issue in Seyfried.
A. The First Amendment and Academic Freedom
Although the applicability of the first amendment to second-
ary school students had been recognized as early as 1943,47 the
concept of "academic freedom" did not fully surface until the late
1960's. In Keyishian v. Board of Regents,4 s Justice Brennan intro-
duced the notion of the classroom as a "marketplace of ideas. '4
45. Id.
46. In fact, the notion of students' rights did not become a widely acknowledged ele-
ment of school law until the "academic freedom" line of cases in the mid-1960's. Thus, in
the 1955 edition of his book, The Courts and the Public Schools, Newton Edwards omitted
any overt reference to the existence of such rights. In the 1971 edition of this book, however,
there is an entire section on students' rights. N. EDWARDS, THE COURTS AND THE PUBLIC
SCHOOLS 640-64 (3d ed. 1971).
47. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Burnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
48. 385 U.S. 589 (1966).
49. Id. at 603. Justice Brennan continued: "The Nation's future depends upon leaders
trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers 'truth out of
a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection.'" Id. (ci-
[Vol. 31
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Three years later, in the watershed decision of Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District,"0 the Court de-
cisively furthered that notion. Tinker firmly established that the
first amendment rights of secondary school students could not be
abridged without a showing of constitutionally valid reasons for
regulating their speech."
The precise contours of the "academic freedom" fostered by
Keyishian and Tinker have proven less than clear.2 In Tinker, the
Court recognized the need for upholding the comprehensive au-
thority of public school officials to prescribe and control conduct in
the schools, so long as such authority is exercised consistently with
fundamental constitutional safeguards.53 The oft-repeated stan-
dard for determining the necessity of judicial intervention has
been defined as whether "basic constitutional values are sharply'
implicated." 4 One circuit has interpreted these principles to mean
tation omitted). It should be noted that Keyishian arose in the context of a state university,
not a public high school. The case, however, has served as a major reference point in many
cases concerning high school academic freedom. See Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees
Union Free School Dist., No. 26, 638 F.2d 404, 416-17 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd, 102 S.Ct. 2799
(1982); Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1306 (7th Cir. 1980).
50.' 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
51. Id. at 506. The Tinker opinion initially established what has become a well-known
principle in students' rights law, i.e., that students do not "shed their constitutional rights
of freedom of speech and expression at the schoolhouse gate." Id. The Court later elabo-
rated that "[s]chool officials do not possess absolute authority over their students .... In
the absence of a specific showing of constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their speech,
students are entitled to freedom of expression of their views." Id. at 511.
52. In Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980), the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated: "Less clear are the precise contours of this
constitutionally protected academic freedom, and particularly its appropriate role when the
concern is not the rarified atmosphere of the college or university, but rather the heartier
environment of the secondary school." Id. at 1304. Zykan involved removal of certain books
from English courses and the library of a high school, elimination of certain courses from
the curriculum, and failure to rehire a number of teachers. As to the claimed unconstitution-
ality of removing the book Go Ask Alice from the school library, as well as the other claims,
the court found no first amendment violation, noting "[t]he amended complaint nowhere
suggests that in taking these actions defendants have been guided by an interest in impos-
ing some religious or scientific orthodoxy or a desire to eliminate a particular kind of inquiry
generally." Id. at 1306. However, plaintiffs were allowed to amend their complaint to allege
a legally cognizable claim.
53. 393 U.S. at 507.
54. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968). But see Appellants' Opening Brief at
31, Seyfried v. Walton, 512 F. Supp. 235 (D. Del. 1981), aff'd, 668 F.2d 414 (3d Cir. 1982)
[hereinafter cited as Appellants' Opening Brief] (quoting Buss, Procedural Due Process for
School Discipline: Probing the Constitutional Outline, 119 U. PA. L. Rav. 545, 570 (1971))
(challenging the Epperson viewpoint). Both the appellants and Professor Buss believe:
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that a school board "will be permitted to make even ill-advised
and imprudent decisions without the risk of judicial
interference. "5The two most frequently cited bases for deference towards the
judgment of local school officials are the students' lack of full intel-
lectual development, 6 and the "indoctrination theory," which em-
phasizes the broad discretion given school officials "in shaping
young minds to accomplish the goals of socialization and academic
achievement. 57 In view of the continued viability of these theories
in many jurisdictions,58 it is not surprising to find general endorse-
ment of Tinker's admonition that the first amendment must be
"applied in the light of the special characteristics of the school en-
vironment. s5  However, courts and commentators have offered va-
rying opinions on the extent to which adult and student first
Although ...arguments for judicial nonintervention are understandable and
valid up to a point, they do not justify the exaggerated deference that often
results. Fundamental educational policy for public schools in the United States
is uniformly made by lay boards of education, entitled to no more judicial re-
spect-on grounds of expertise-than any other subordinate political body.
Appellants' Opening Brief, supra, at 31; Buss, supra, at 570-71.
55. Zykan, 631 F.2d at 1306.
56. [T]he student's right to and need for such (academic) freedom is bounded by
the level of his or her intellectual development. A high school student's lack of
the intellectual skills necessary for taking full advantage of the marketplace of
ideas engenders a correspondingly greater need for direction and guidance from
those better equipped by experience and reflection to make critical educational
choices.
Id. at 1304.
57. Comment, School Library Censorship: First Amendment Guarantees and the Stu-
dent's Right to Know, 57 U. DaT. J. URB. L. 523, 529 (1980) [hereinafter cited as School
Library Censorship]. The district court in Seyfried stated that "[a] principal function of all
elementary and secondary education is indoctrinative-whether it be to teach the ABC's or
multiplication tables or to transmit the basic values of the community." 512 F. Supp. at 238
(quoting James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 573 (2d Cir. 1972)).
58. See, e.g., Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980).
In Zykan, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated: "[T]he importance of sec-
ondary schools in the development of intellectual faculties is only one part of a broad forma-
tive role encompassing the encouragement and nurturing of those fundamental social, politi-
cal, and moral values that will permit a student to take his place in the community." Id. at
1301.
59. 393 U.S. at 506. See Baughmann v. Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1973). In
Baughmann, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit declared that "[s]econdary school
children are within the protection of the first amendment, although their rights are not
coextensive with those of adults." Id. at 1351. See also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Com-
munity School Dist., 393 U.S. at 515 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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amendment rights should diverge. 0
In examining students' rights cases, one must keep in mind
that the exceptions to freedom of speech protection mentioned in
Part I of this Comment are also operative within the school con-
text. In Seyfried, neither the defendants nor the reviewing courts
forcefully contended that Pippin fell within any of these excep-
tions.61 However, it is not inconceivable that a particular play
might be found to contain "that degree of sexual explicitness that
renders material inappropriate for availability in a school attended
by young children, 6e2 the lessened standard of obscenity utilized
by one circuit in high school situations. 3 For example, one would
not expect the first amendment to protect the right of high school
thespians to perform Oh, Calcutta! or, ironically, even Hair, as the
school-sponsored play.6 4
60. The Seventh Circuit, in student press cases such as Fujishima v. Board of Educ.,
460 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972), suggested that student first amendment rights are nearly
coextensive with those of adults. Compare the Second Circuit's position in this realm (see
Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512 (1977) where student first amendment rights are severely
circumscribed in comparison with those of adults. Compare also the liberal position of
Stern, Challenging Ideological Exclusion of Curriculum, 14 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 485
(1980) with the far more conservative stance of Orleans, What Johnny Can't Read: "First
Amendment Rights" in the Classroom, 10 J. L. & EDUC. 1 (1981).
61. Ambiguity surrounded the superintendent's charges against the play.
At trial, it was asserted by the ... Superintendent that the excised version of
"Pippin" to be presented offended the District's Student Rights Policy regarding
"obscene, vulgar, and inflammatory statements." The superintendent clarified
this assertion by subsequently acknowledging that the material to be presented
was probably not inflammatory. Thus, the remaining implication is that even the
excised version of "Pippin" to be presented in this instance was "obscene" or
"vulgar."
Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note 54, at 21. Whatever the motivations of the superin-
tendent were when he cancelled the production, obscenity or incitement were not raised as a
defense of the school offidials' actions at trial.
62. Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School Bd. of Directors, 638 F.2d 438, 441 n.3
(2d Cir. 1980).
63. Meanwhile, one commentator, combining the holdings of Miller and Ginsberg v.
New York, 340 U.S. 629 (1968), proposed a more rigid test as to whether material available
to minors is obscene. This test provides that material is obscene if it:
1) appeals to the prurient interest of the average minor, applying contem-
porary community standards;
2) depicts or describes in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct defined
by the applicable local law; and
3) lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors.
Comment, Obscenity, Profanity and the High School Press, 15 WLLIAnrE L.J. 507, 515
(1979).
64. "Whether or not a production [of Hair] as described by the District Court is ob-
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The specific student activity in question in the seminal Tinker
case was the wearing of black armbands to protest the Vietnam
War. 5 The spirit of the decision, though, has hovered over all of
the student rights conflicts which have subsequently reached the
courts.6 Two of the most significant and frequently-litigated issues
in this area are whether local school officials may constitutionally
remove a controversial book from school libraries, 7 or impose prior
restraints upon student publications.
The district court in Seyfried stated that "the role of a school
sponsored theatrical production in the life of the school is quite
different from that of the library or of non-program related expres-
sions of student opinion [in which category it apparently included
student publications].""s By so declaring, the court apparently felt
justified in ignoring important developments in other circuits re-
garding the First Amendment rights of students. The remainder of
this Comment will summarize these developments, and will suggest
that it was error to dismiss them so readily.
scene and may be forbidden to adult audiences, it is apparent to me that the state of Ten-
nessee could constitutionally forbid exhibition of the musical to children ... " Conrad, 420
U.S. at 69 (White, J., dissenting).
In 1980, a high school speech and drama teacher in Maryland proposed to put on Hair as
the annual school production, but administrators refused to approve the play. The teacher
then submitted One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest as an alternate choice, but that work was
also rejected. See infra note 163.
65. 393 U.S. at 503. In Reply Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 3-4, Seyfried v. Walton,
512 F. Supp. 235 (D. Del. 1981), af'd, 668 F.2d 414 (3d Cir. 1982) [hereinafter cited as
Reply Brief], the plaintiffs-appellants in Seyfried expended some effort in developing an
analogy between the student protest and Pippin:
The facts of the Tinker decision are particularly poignant here because the de-
struction and futility of war is one of the many aspects of life that is satirized in
the production of 'Pippin'.. . .[T]he satirizing of certain viewpoints in the con-
text of a dramatic production is really a much gentler form of protest than the
wearing of black armbands as occurred in the Tinker confrontation.
Id.
66. Both Seyfried courts cited Tinker. See 668 F.2d at 216; 512 F. Supp. at 237.
67. Two recent articles indicate that the removal of books from school libraries is ris-
ing. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1981, at C5, col. 1 (newly resurgent conservative groups have
greatly increased the attacks on books in public schools in recent years); Press, Can Schools
Ban Books?, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 15, 1982, at 82 (about 1,000 incidents each year involving
putative censors in schools and public libraries).
68. 512 F. Supp. at 238. The court of appeals accepted this finding without question:
"We believe that the district court properly distinguished student newspapers and other
'non-program related expressions of student opinion' from school-sponsored theatrical pro-
ductions." 668 F.2d at 216.
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B. Library Book Removal Cases
1. Pre-Seyfried cases. The Sixth Circuit, in Minarcini v.
Strongville City School District,9 relied on the fledgling first
amendment principle of an individual's right to know and receive
information,"0 and held the banning of three books by school au-
thorities to be violative of the freedom of speech clause.71 The
court stressed that once a school board has created a privilege for
students by providing a library and filling its shelves with certain
books, the board cannot condition such privilege on grounds "re-
lated solely to the social or political tastes of ... [its] members. ' 2
Several courts have adhered to this proposition, 3 while others
have explicitly rejected it. 74
It is well-settled that "bare allegations that books have been
removed from .. .secondary school libraries by responsible offi-
cials do not make out a prima facie First Amendment violation. ' '1 5
However, courts in cases decided prior to Seyfried failed to enunci-
ate precise standards as to the elements of a violation. This uncer-
tain state of the law was nowhere more apparent than in the Sec-
ond Circuit, which, in 1972, decided the first school library case,
President's Council, District 25 v. Community School Board No.
69. 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976).
70. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens' Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748 (1976). In Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, the Court explained, "Efireedom of
speech presupposes a willing speaker. But where a speaker exists, as is the case here, the
,protection afforded is to the communication, to its source, and to its recipients both." Id. at
756. See also School Library Censorship, supra note 54, at 535-37 for a fuller discussion of
the law of this area.
71. In Minarcini, the school board had refused to approve Heller's Catch-22 and Von-
negut's God Bless You, Mr. Rosewater as texts or library books, ordered Vonnegut's Cat's
Cradle and Catch-22 removed from the school library, and issued resolutions which served
to prohibit teacher and student discussion of these books in class or their use as supplemen-
tal reading. See 541 F.2d at 579.
72. Id. at 582.
73. See Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269 (D.N.H. 1979); Right to Read
Defense Comm. of Chelsea v. School Comm. of Chelsea, 454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978).
74. See Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School Bd. of Directors, 638 F.2d 438 (2d
Cir. 1980); President's Council Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd., 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.
1972). See also Zykan, 631 F.2d at 1308.
75. Pico v. Board. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist., No. 26, 638 F.2d 404,
414 (2d Cir. 1980), afi'd, 102 S. Ct. 2799 (1982). A prima facie case is not established, "even
if the books have a controversial reputation so that one available inference is that they were
removed to prohibit the expression of ideas they contain." Id. This latter proposition is
currently not clearly settled.
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25.76 This decision firmly repudiated the argumeht that the first
amendment rights of junior high school students were infringed
when the school board revoked free library access to a controver-
sial book.7 7 Subsequent cases in the Second Circuit involving simi-
lar facts produced erratic results."'
Addressing the Minarcini and President's Council holdings,
one commentator suggested that the emerging test in determining
the propriety of removing books from school libraries was to ex-
amine the motivations of the officials involved .7  This prediction
appears to be borne out by later cases. In Right to Read Defense
Committee of Chelsea v. Community School Board,80 the Massa-
76. 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972).
77. The defendant school board in this action had voted to remove from all junior high
school libraries in the District all copies of Down These Mean Streets by Piri Thomas, the
same book at issue in the late Pico case. After the book was initially removed, the board
passed a resolution permitting the book to be kept at those libraries, but making it available
only on a direct loan basis to the parents of children attending these schools. Several stu-
dents, parents, teachers and others, finding even this lesser restraint objectionable, filed suit
for violation of the first amendment. The court, emphasizing the concept of judicial defer-
ence towards school board decisions, concluded: "After a careful review of the record before
us and the precedents we find no impingement upon any basic constitutional values." Id. at
291.
78. Compare Pico v. Board, of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist., No. 26, 638
F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1980) (removal of school library books offended Constitution) with Bick-
nell v. Vergennes Union High School Rd. of Directors, 638 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1980) (a less
complicated and drawn-out removal scheme passed constitutional challenge).
In Bicknell, the Second Circuit further explained that the complaint and supporting affi-
davits, unlike those in Pico, failed to present a triable issue "as to whether the book removal
had created a sufficient risk of suppressing ideas within the community to constitute a First
Amendment violation." 638 F.2d at 440.
79. In Note, First Amendment-Free Speech: Right to Know-Limit of School Board's
Discretion in Curricular Choice-Public School Library as Marketplace of Ideas, 27 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 1034 (1977), the commentator suggests:
In President's Council, unlike Minarcini, where it was clear that the board was
motivated by personal value judgments, the board's motivation in removing the
books was unclear .... Assuming courts reconcile the Sixth and Second Circuit
opinions based upon factual difference, then it is likely that in future cases deal-
ing with removal of books from a public school library the school board's moti-
vation will be the essential issue. This will require a case-by-case factual
analysis.
Id. at 1053-54.
80. 454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978). The defendant school board removed an anthol-
ogy of writings by adolescents from a high school library on the grounds that the language
and theme of a poem in the anthology might have a damaging impact on the students. The
district court held that this action did not serve a substantial governmental interest and
infringed on the first amendment rights of students and teachers. In support of its decision,
the court stressed evidence that the anthology was relevant to a number of courses taught at
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chusetts District Court announced that the constitutionality of
book removal may hinge on "the reasons underlying the actions of
school officials."81 The Second Circuit relied on similar reasoning
in Pico v. Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School
District, where it found that first amendment values were impli-
cated when several books were taken and banned from the shelves
of a senior high school library in an "erratic, arbitrary, and free-
wheeling manner. '8 2 There, the court indicated that the deciding
factor was the strong inference supplied by the facts of the case
that political views and personal taste were being dictated not for
the welfare of the children, but for the purpose of establishing
those views as correct and orthodox.8 3 The Seventh Circuit has ex-
pressed analogous concerns, warning that a school administrator
may not "remove a book from the library as part of a purge of all
material offensive to a single, exclusive perception of the way of
the world. '8 4
the school, and that the implicated school officials failed to contend that the book was ob-
scene, improperly selected, or a cause of any space problem.
81. Id. at 712. In making this determination, the Massachusetts District Court relied on
the Supreme Court's reasoning in Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274
(1977), which involved an untenured teacher's claim that his contract was not renewed in
violation of his first amendment rights. The Supreme Court stated that "he may nonetheless
establish a claim to reinstatement if the decision not to rehire him was made by reason of
his exercise of constitutionally protected First Amendment freedoms." Id. at 283-84.
82. 638 F.2d at 416.
83. The Second Circuit explained:
Clearly, mere reference by a defendant to personal standards of taste or political
philosophy as one factor in a decision involving first amendment values cannot,
in and of itself, provide a basis for rationally inferring an intent to suppress the
different views of others .... Where, however, as in this case, evidence that the
decisions made were made based on defendants' moral or political beliefs ap-
pears together with evidence of procedural and substantive irregularities suffi-
cient to suggest an unwillingness on the part of school officials to subject their
political and personal judgments to the same sort of scrutiny as that accorded
other decisions relating to the education of their charges, an inference emerges
that political views and personal taste are being asserted not in the interests of
the children's well-being, but rather for the purpose of establishing those views
as the correct and orthodox ones for all purposes in the particular community.
Id. at 417.
84. Zykan, 631 F.2d at 1308. While the Zykan court did not find a constitutional viola-
tion in the defendant school board's decision to permanently remove Go Ask Alice from a
high school library, as described in the pleadings, "the articulation of the principles at issue
here is sufficiently novel and important that plaintiffs should be given leave to amend their
complaint again, if they can, to allege the kind of interference with academic freedom, that
has been found to be cognizable." Id. at 1308-09.
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2. Post-Seyfried developments. Although one early 1982 dis-
trict court decision appeared to introduce an "effects" test in
school library book removal situations, 5 the Supreme Court sev-
eral months later indicated that intent remained the primary con-
sideration. Justice Brennan, in a plurality opinion affirming the
judgment in Pico,s8 wrote:
Thus, whether petitioners' removal of books from their school libraries de-
nied respondents their First Amendment rights depends upon the motivation
behind petitioners' actions. If petitioners intended by their removal decision
to deny respondents access to ideas with which petitioners disagreed, and if
this intent was the decisive factor in petitioners' decision, then petitioners
have exercised their discretion in violation of the Constitution."
Admittedly, as noted by the dissent, the opinion produced "no
binding holding . . .' on the critical constitutional issue pre-
sented.""" Nevertheless, the language utilized by Justice Brennan
clearly suggests that the current preferred approach in library
book cases is to inquire into the motivations of the school officials
85. Sheck v. Baileyville School Comm., 530 F. Supp. 679 (D. Me. 1982). At one point,
the court stated, "[h]ow anomalous and dangerous then to presume that state action ban-
ning an entire book, where the social value of its content is roundly praised and stands
unchallenged by the state, does not directly and sharply implicate first amendment rights
because the ban was not intended to suppress ideas." Id. at 687. The case involved removal
of 365 Days, Ronald J. Glasser's compilation of nonfictional Vietnam War accounts by
American combat soldiers.
86. 102 S. Ct. 2799 (1982). In holding for students-respondents, the Court was careful
to point out the narrow bounds of its decision. Justice Brennan took pains to distinguish the
removal of library books from the initial acquisition of such books, and stated that the Pico
holding applied only to the former activity. Id. at 2805-06. In addition, he stressed the pro-
cedural stance of the case--since summary judgment was involved, all that needed to be
found was any "genuine issue as to any material fact." Id. at 2806.
The volatile nature of the library book removal issue is evidenced by the forcefully-
worded dissenting opinions filed in Pico by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Rehn-
quist and O'Connor. Id. at 2817, 2822, 2827, 2835.
87. Id. at 2810. The passage continued:
On the other hand, respondents implicitly concede that an unconstitutional mo-
tivation would not be demonstrated if it were shown that petitioners had de-
cided to remove the books at issue because those books were pervasively vul-
gar .... And again, respondents concede that if it were demonstrated that the
removal decision was based solely upon the "educational suitability" of the
books in question, then their removal would be "perfectly permissible.". . . In
other words, in respondents' view such motivations, if decisive of petitioners'
actions, would not carry the danger of an official suppression of ideas, and thus
would not violate respondents' First Amendment rights.
Id.
88. Id. at 2818 n.2 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
1982] SCHOOL-SPONSORED PLAYS 563
involved.
The formulation of a test centering on a subjective value such
as intent is an open invitation to ambiguity. What often emerges is
an elusive and very fine line separating permissible from impermis-
sible regulation. In a footnote in Pico, the Second Circuit implied
that a key to ascertaining proper/improper intent is the existence
of "sufficiently regular procedure for applying . . . criteria."89 Jus-
tice Brennan adopts this reasoning, strongly linking "irregular and
ad hoc removal procedures" with impermissible motivations." This
approach alleviates the vagueness of the intent test, allowing in-
quiry into more "tangible" procedural matters.
3. Application of the intent test to Seyfried. Although the
Seyfried decision preceded the Supreme Court's ruling in Pico, the
latter case is not irrelevant here. As already seen, Justice Bren-
nan's opinion simply marked the culmination of a trend towards
examining the motivations of school officials who remove library
books. If one considers the concept of intent in its broadest form,
analysis of Seyfried produces uncertain results.9 1 It could be ar-
gued that cancellation of the play by the superintendent, without
89. What is required in order to avoid the effect of governing school affairs simply
by a vague and indefinite pall of orthodoxy is the development of a set of suffi-
ciently objective criteria for the identification of speech which will be objected to
and a sufficiently regular procedure for applying these criteria in concrete cases
to permit students to determine with a reasonable degree of certainty what
speech will be prohibited and when.
638 F.2d at 418 n.13. While the word "effect" is employed here, other portions of the Pico
opinion make it clear that the court feels that such "effect" is inextricably tied to improper
intent on the part of school officials. Logical extension of the above-quoted proposition
would require a finding of improper intent on the part of school officials when they do not
act pursuant to a set procedure in regulating students' first amendment rights.
90. This would be a very different case if the record demonstrated that petition-
ers had employed established, regular, and facially unbiased procedures for the
review of controversial materials. But the actual record in the case. . . suggests
the exact opposite. In sum, respondents' allegations and some of the evidentiary
materials presented below do not rule out the possibility that petitioners' re-
moval procedures were highly irregular and ad hoc-the antithesis of those pro-
cedures that might tend to allay suspicions regarding petitioners' motivations.
102 S. Ct. at 2811-12.
91. On appeal, the plaintiffs-appellants in Seyfried failed to specifically advance the
"intent" argument. They did, however, spend considerable effort in pointing out that the
school officials' actions imposed a "pall of orthodoxy" on the district. In other words, the
appellants focused not on the superintendents intent, but on the chilling effect of his deci-
sion. As seen above, the "intent" test is intertwined to a certain degree with the "effects"
test. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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his having attended a single rehearsal,92 manifested a desire to
suppress the ideas contained in the play, and to create a "pall of
orthodoxy"9' 3 over the district. On the other hand, one might ac-
cept at face value the superintendent's assertion that he halted
production of Pippin solely because of its alleged "explicit sexual
overtones. ' 94 If, however, the intent test is applied with primary
emphasis on the adequacy of the procedures afforded, matters are
greatly simplified. The conduct of the superintendent in acting
under the vague and insubstantial authority of the district's stu-
dent rights policy forbidding "obscene, vulgar and inflammatory
statements," ' could not survive this more rigid test.
C. The Student Press Cases
Unlike the removal of library books, student press regulations
usually involve the concept of prior restraint. This distinction con-
stitutes one of the reasons why a separate body of rules has been
developed in this second important group of students' rights cases.
Just as the first amendment in general is applied differently in the
school context, the specialized doctrine of prior restraint also gen-
erally receives disparate treatment in adult and student cases. For
example, the Second Circuit, confronting a school board policy
which prohibited the distribution of any written matter within the
school without the prior approval of administrators, has com-
mented, "In the adult world, of course, this policy would have suc-
cumbed to our heavy presumption against prior restraints ...
Yet, because we recognized the unique requirements of the educa-
tional process, we declined to hold that a system of prior restraint
is presumptively unconstitutional."96 Clearly, the underlying bases
for judicial deference towards the judgment of school officials 7 are
still operative in situations involving prior restraints.
92. The brother of the school board president complained on Friday about the content
of Pippin. The following Monday, the school board president met with the superintendent,
and on the following day the superintendent decided to cancel the production. 668 F.2d at
215.
93. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603.
94. 668 F.2d at 220.
95. Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note 54, at 10.
96. Thomas v. Board of Educ. of Granville Cent. School Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1049 (2d
Cir. 1979) (addressing the Second Circuit's earlier decision in Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of
Edue., 440 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1971)).
97. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
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Notwithstanding the above considerations, the heavy pre-
sumption against prior restraints in adult law does mean that the
balance will be weighted more heavily against school officials in
these cases than in general first amendment cases, such as those
dealing with the removal of library books. While the majority of
circuits have declined to recognize the per se unconstitutionality of
prior restraints on the student press, only one appellate case has
expressly upheld such a restraint.98 Conflicting attitudes abound,
though, towards the proper judicial stance in these cases.
In Tinker, the Supreme Court held that in order for school
authorities to prohibit a student's expression of opinion, they must
show that the prohibited conduct would "materially and substan-
tially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in
the school." 9  This rule applies to all forms of expression, including
the student press. 00 However, since the Supreme Court has offered
only the most general leadership in this area, some courts con-
fronting regulation of school newspapers have chosen to formulate
their own tests rather than use that set forth in Tinker.1°1
1. The majority position. Both the Seventh and Fourth Cir-
cuits have repeatedly condemned prior restraints of student publi-
cations. In fact, the Seventh Circuit originally stated, in Fujishima
v. Board of Education,10 2 that such restraints were unconstitu-
98. Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977) (plaintiff high school students
submitted to various school officials a plan to survey the sexual attitudes of students, in-
cluding such issues as homosexuality and premarital sex). See also Comment, Tinker's Leg-
acy: Freedom of the Press in Public High Schools, 28 DE PAUL L. REv. 387, 416-17 (1979).
99. 393 U.S. at 509.
100. Comment, supra note 63, at 510.
101. See, e.g., Pico v. Board. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist., No. 26,
638 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1980). As stated by one commentator:
The Supreme Court, by virtue of its uncertain stance regarding the level of scru-
tiny to be applied in this area, has provided the lower courts with a wealth of
theories, tests and justifications from which to choose when deciding children's
rights cases. In the absence of strong leadership from the Supreme Court each
circuit has developed a separate and somewhat unique body of law concerning
the issue of student prior restraints. Although the results have been admirable in
that student First Amendment rights are almost uniformly protected, the diver-
sity of theories applied to achieve this protection has resulted in the confusing
and chaotic development of the law.
Comment, supra note 98, at 417.
102. 460 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972). Plaintiff high school students were suspended for
distributing on school grounds an "underground" newspaper and a petition calling for
"teach-ins" concerning the Vietnam War. The suit was filed in challenge to the constitution-
ality of a Chicago Board of Education rule which stated: "No person shall be permitted...
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tional per se.' 0s The Tinker substantial disruption/material inter-
ference test was held to govern only the constitutionality of post-
publication penalties.1 04 In the next student press case, 05 however,
the court appeared to alter its approach significantly. It relied on
objections as to vagueness and overbreadth, rather than on the
Fujishima per se rule, to strike down several rules which author-
ized prior restraints. The opinion indicated that the Tinker test
was not irrelevant to prior restraint cases.106 Nevertheless, it re-
mained clear that school officials had to meet a high standard in
order to justify regulations forbidding distribution of a student
publication.
While the Fourth Circuit has never espoused a rule recogniz-
ing prior restraint of student publications as unconstitutional per
se, it has imposed stringent requirements on school officials in this
realm. In order to avoid constitutional infirmity, a system of prior
restraints must precisely describe forbidden behavior, define "dis-
tribution," provide for prompt approval/disapproval of submitted
material, specify the effect of failure to act promptly, and offer an
adequate and prompt appeals procedure.10 7 These requirements
to distribute on the school premises any books, tracts, or other publications. . . unless the
same have been approved by the General Superintendent of Schools." Id. at 1356.
103. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that "[b]ecause Section 6-19 requires prior approval
of publications, it is unconstitutional as a prior restraint in violation of the First Amend-
ment. . . .This conclusion is compelled by combining the holdings of Near v. Minnesota
and Tinker." Id. at 1357.
104. "The Tinker forecast rule is properly a formula for determining when the require-
ments of school discipline justify punishment of students for exercise of their First Amend-
ment rights. It is not a basis for establishing a system of censorship and licensing designed
to prevent the exercise of First Amendment rights." Id. at 1358.
105. Jacobs v. Board of School Comm'rs, 490 F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1973), vacated as moot,
420 U.S. 128 (1975) (unofficial student newspaper contained "a few earthy words relating to
bodily functions and sexual intercourse," and a cartoon depicting "a sequence of incidents
in a bathroom."). Id. at 610.
106. Addressing a provision which stated that "literature shall not be distributed by
any student in any school while classes are being conducted in the school in which distribu-
tion is to be-made," the Jacobs court said: "We conclude that the defendants have not
satisfied their burden of demonstrating that the regulation banning distribution at all these
times is narrowly drawn to further the state's legitimate interest in preventing material dis-
ruption of classwork." Id. at 609.
107. In Balghman v. Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1973), the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit explained:
Such prior restraints must contain precise criteria sufficiently spelling out what
is forbidden so that a reasonably intelligent student will know what he may
write and what he may not write.. . .A prior restraint system, even though
precisely defining what may not be written, is nevertheless invalid unless it pro-
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have proven difficult to meet. In one case,108 a school board regula-
tion which allowed the distribution of literature which "does not
reasonably lead the principal to forecast substantial disruption of
or material interference with school activities"109 was held too im-
precise to afford the necessary safeguards against invasion of first
amendment rights."0 While at first glance such a holding may
seem to indicate a rejection of the Tinker standard, in actuality it
only means that a regulation must "detail the criteria by which an
administrator might reasonably predict the occurrence of a disrup-
tion."""" This case reveals the willingness of the Fourth Circuit to
question the judgment of school officials in situations involving
prior restraint of student publications; the court is taking the
"must be able to show" language of the Tinker rule quite
literally.112
A recent decision in this jurisdiction suggests a possible re-
treat from the rigid earlier position. In Williams v. Spencer,"' the
Fourth Circuit upheld a school regulation which authorized re-
straints, after initial distribution, of publications encouraging ac-
tions "which endanger the health or safety of students."" 4 While
the regulation and the facts at issue in Williams are sufficiently
vides for: 1) A definition of Distribution and its application to different kinds of
material; 2) Prompt approval or disapproval of what is submitted; 3) Specifica-
tion of the effect of failure to act promptly; and 4) An adequate and prompt
appeals procedure.
Id. at 1351.
108. Nitzberg v. Parks, 525 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1975).
109. Id. at 381.
110. See Comment, supra note 98, at 409. The court took special note of the fact that
the regulation lacked guidelines for determining what would constitute a "substantial dis-
ruption of or a material interference with school activities," as well as for what would be the
appropriate criteria an administrator might use to reasonably predict the occurrence of such
a disruption. Id.
111. 525 F.2d at 383.
112. See Comment, supra note 98, at 409.
113. 622 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir. 1980).
114. Id. at 1205. The Williams court continued: "The regulation read in full, 'Distribu-
tion may be halted, and disciplinary action taken by the principal after the distribution has
begun if the publication... 5) Encourages actions which endanger the health or safety of
students.'" Id.
The student newspaper in Williams contained an advertisement for a "headshop" spe-
cializing in the sale of drug paraphernalia. The ad primarily promoted the sale of a
waterpipe used to smoke marijuana and hashish. There was also an ad for devices used in
connection with cocaine. Id. at 1205.
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distinguishable from those in prior cases115 so as not to signal a
marked deviation from the earlier holdings, the court may have
opened new doors in stating that the Tinker rule "is merely one
justification for school authorities to restrain the distribution of a
publication; nowhere has it been held to be the sole justifica-
tion.1116 Future decisions should clarify whether Williams marks
the inauguration of a more relaxed standard of scrutiny in the
Fourth Circuit.
2. Minority stance. Second Circuit courts have refused to
follow any consistent pattern in their adjudication of student press
disputes. The regulation at issue in Eisner v. Stamford Board of
Education,117 the court's first case in this area, was found lacking
in procedural safeguards and therefore unconstitutional, on the
grounds that it did not precisely define the meaning of "distribu-
tion," 18 it did not prescribe a definite brief period within which
review of submitted material would be completed, and it failed to
specify the individual(s) to whom material should be submitted as
evidence.119 While the Eisner holding did not impose an insur-
mountable burden on school officials,1 20 a later decision appeared
to increase this burden. In Bayer v. Kinzler1 21 the District Court
for the Eastern District of New York, finding that the expression
in question was "at least [as] deserving of protection under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments as the symbolic wearing of an
armband, 1 22 concluded that the school official's actions were not
reasonably necessary to avoid material and substantial interference
115. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit explained:
The nature of the restraint in this case is far less burdensome than was true in
Quarterman, Baughman, and Nitzberg. In those cases the relevant regulations
required that the publication be submitted to the principal prior to distribution,
whereas here the students were not required to acquire approval before begin-
ning distribution of the paper. Indeed, those cases could be read to apply only to
those situations where prior approval from the appropriate school official is re-
quired before any distribution may occur.
Id. at 1206.
116. Id.
117. 440 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1971).
118. Id. at 811.
119. Id. at 810-11.
120. Comment, supra note 98, at 416.
121. 383 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 515 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1975) (student
newspaper contained a sex information supplement including articles on contraception and
abortion).
122. 383 F. Supp. at 1165.
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with school work or discipline. 23 In essence, the court was directly
infusing the Tinker standard into the student press area. This par-
ticular approach had previously been utilized by the Fifth
Circuit. 124
Rather than following this example of straightforward applica-
tion of the Tinker test, the Second Circuit, in its next case, cut an
entirely new path. In Trachtman v. Anker,125 the court upheld the
decision of school officials to deny students permission to dis-"
tribute and publish the results of a questionnaire exploring sexual
attitudes of pupils of a New York City high school. The court re-
lied on what dissenting Judge Mansfield characterized as "dicta in
Tinker . . to the effect that school authorities may prohibit
speech that 'intrudes upon ... the rights of other students,' or
'involves ...an invasion of the rights of others.' ",126 Trachtman
introduced the novel theory that prior restraint of student publica-
tions is justified where it is "likely"' 127 that the particular expres-
sion involved will inflict "emotional disturbance" or "psychological
harm" on some students.128 The Second Circuit based its finding of
"likely" psychological harm on dubious grounds, 29 thus displaying
a great reluctance to tamper with the authority of school officials.
While Second Circuit courts had undeniably sent out conflict-
ing signals in earlier student press cases, the confidence displayed
by the Trachtman court in setting forth its unprecedented theory
seemed a portent of future exaggerated deference to the actions of
school officials. Fears of such deference were not dispelled by a
New York district court's next foray into this area. In Frasca v.
Andrews,130 where a high school principal had refused to allow dis-
123. Id.
124. See Shanley v. Northeast Indep. School Dist., 462 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972).
125. 563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977).
126. Id. at 520-21 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513).
127. 563 F.2d at 517.
128. Id. at 519.
129. The court relied on the affidavits of "four experts in the fields of psychology and
psychiatry," procured by the defendants, ignoring the fact that the plaintiffs produced five
equally qualified experts who not only denied that the questionnaire would create emotional
disturbance, but asserted it would be psychologically beneficial to students. Id. at 517, 525.
130. 463 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). The material complained of in Frasca included
a letter from the lacrosse team to the official school newspaper questioning the lack of la-
crosse articles and closing, "We would like a formal apology in public or else we will kick
your greasy ass." Id. at 1046. The letter was signed "Pissed Off" Lacrosse Team. Another
example is an article characterizing the vice-president of the student body as "a total failure
1982] 569
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tribution of a newspaper, the court sought only "a substantial and
reasonable basis for the action taken." 131
Although Frasca involved, not a "psychological harm" theory,
but a more traditional Tinker "potential disruption" situation, the
decision clearly embodied the spirit of Trachtman. Current Second
Circuit law, then, allows school officials wide parameters in which
to act regarding student publications. Courts in this jurisdiction
appear willing to conduct only a limited inquiry into such prior
restraints.
3. Application of the student press case tests to Seyfried.
The actions taken by the superintendent to prohibit the produc-
tion of Pippin would obviously be overturned if the per se rule of
Fujishima were applied. His actions also would not survive appli-
cation of the modified Seventh Circuit test or the Fourth Circuit's
approach, both of which require specific and elaborate procedural
safeguards to prevent regulation of speech on the basis of unjusti-
fied forecasts of substantial disruption/material interference with
school discipline. 13 2 The superintendent cancelled the production
based on a reading of the play's script, conferral with several other
school officials, and pursuant to no established policy.1 33 Dissatis-
in performing his duties," and "a total disgrace to the school." Id.
131. Id. at 1052. Language in support of this position was also called from Eisner, 440
F.2d at 810.
132. In the Appellants' answering brief, defendants-appellees in Seyfried unconsciously
admit the lack of a set procedure:
In discussing the administrative functions in the school district, [the superinten-
dent] stated that it should be standard operating procedure for a high school
principal to have administrative control over what goes on in the school, includ-
ing the presentation of theatrical productions by the school. In the context of
the situation at issue, [the superintendent] stated that he expected the principal
in question to be aware of what play was being presented in the high school and
to be knowledgeable about the play itself. Further, [the superintendent] indi-
cated that he would expect the drama coach to also be accountable in that, par-
ticularly when dealing with a borderline play such as "Pippin," some discussion
concerning the play with administrative staff should have occurred. Since this
procedure had not occurred when [the superintendent's] attention was directed
to the play, he was obliged to take action in the matter.
Brief for Appellees at 10, Seyfried v. Walton, 512 F. Supp. 235 (D. Del. 1981), af'd, 668 F.2d
414 (3d Cir. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellees]. Ironically, as crucial as the
question of procedural due process is to their case, plaintiffs inexplicably failed to raise the
issue in district court.
133. On March 10, 1981, the superintendent met with his central office staff and ques-
tioned another official about Pippin. At the conclusion of the meeting, without speaking
with any of the teachers or students involved, he decided to cancel the play. On the follow-
ing day, he met with the drama director, after having informed her of his decision. He re-
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fled students were not offered an administrative route by which
they could appeal the decision, and the complaints of parents at a
school board meeting went unheeded.
While the justices deciding the Seyfried case did not utilize
the Trachtman psychological harm test, they did follow the Sec-
ond Circuit trend of seeking merely a rational or reasonable basis
for the regulation of student speech by a school official. In fact, the
district court, whose reasoning was fully adopted by the court of
appeals, applied a more relaxed standard of scrutiny than the Sec-
ond Circuit, casually announcing that "[t]his case involves nothing
more than differing judgments on the extent to which certain as-
pects of human sexuality should be represented on stage by high
school students."'1 4 Although Trachtman and Frasca arguably
provide indirect support for the Third Circuit's decision in
Seyfried, it must be remembered that the Second Circuit position
represents not only a minority view but also a marked deviation
from the Supreme Court's guidance in this area. Therefore, Fourth
and Seventh Circuit cases possess far greater precedential value.
D. Overview-Library Book Removal and Student Press Cases
Viewed Together
Although both directly involve students' rights, the school li-
brary book and student publication cases, for all practical pur-
poses, have each been treated in a vacuum. Despite the fundamen-
tal differences between the traditional right to free expression and
the recently-developed right to know, it is somewhat surprising
that there is not a more extensive overlap in the legal principles
espoused in the two sets of cases. 135 Even more surprising, how-
ever, is that the lack of overlap amounts to outright conflict in at
least two jurisdictions. The Seventh Circuit, which promulgated
the harsh "per se unconstitutionality of prior restraints" rule re-
fused to accede to her request that he attend a rehearsal of the production. Appellants'
Opening Brief, supra note 54, at 11.
134. 512 F. Supp. at 239.
135. One of the relatively rare examples of such overlap may be found in Pico, where
the court warned that a policy must not "unduly [restrict] protected speech, to an extent
greater than is essential 'to the furtherance of the [social] interests [that justify it].'" See
638 F.2d at 416 (relying on a passage in Eisner v. Board of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 806 (2d Cir.
1971)).
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garding student publications,'3 8 later declared that school officials
could make unwise and improvident decisions regarding the re-
moval of school library books and still not risk judicial interven-
tion.137 The same Second Circuit that applied minimal scrutiny to
the prior restraint of a student questionnaire and news article,"5s
proved, at least in one case, considerably more probing in its exam-
ination of the banning of library books by school authorities. 13
Given these apparent inconsistencies, one can only conclude
that the development of a generalized test to determine violations
of students' first amendment rights will not occur in the near fu-
ture. Indeed, conflicts between (and even within) the various cir-
cuits as to the tests to be applied in a single situation, e.g., removal
of a book from the school library, are rampant. The Second Circuit
has conceded that "[i]n circumstances in which so many interests
and public policies converge, relatively minor changes in the pat-
tern of facts presented often deprive precedents of reliability and
cast us more than we would choose upon our own judgment. ' '140
Accordingly, the court cannot consider "just the general outlines,
but [must also look to] the specific facts of the case.' ' 4 1 Such a
loosely-defined approach provides little solace to the student who
136. See Fujishima v. Board of Educ., 460 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir. 1972).
137. See Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980).
138. See Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1971).
139. See Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26, 638 F.2d
404 (2d Cir. 1980). See also supra note 78. A look at the dissents of Judge Mansfield in Pico
and Trachtman increases the irony. In the former, he is aghast at the "indecent matter,
vulgarities, profanities, explicit sexual perversion, or disparaging remarks about Blacks,
Jews or Christ." 638 F.2d at 419 (Mansfield, Cir. J., dissenting), found in library books in a
Long Island school. In Trachtman, however, he adopts the following fatalistic attitude:
In this day and age, when children in New York City are literally bombarded
with explicit sex materials on public newsstands on the way to and from school,
when they are encouraged openly and frankly to discuss sex topics and problems
in "rap sessions" sponsored by their schools ... when the children actually do
discuss sex with their peers at school, when the number of teenage pregnancies
in New York City's public high schools ... is so high that the City has opened a
special high school for pregnant high school girls,. . . when adolescent sexuality
is openly discussed in New York newspapers, I believe the defendants have
failed completely to demonstrate any ... substantial harm to any appreciable
number of high school students [by distribution of a sex questionnaire].
563 F.2d at 526 (Mansfield, Cir. J., dissenting). Community standards are apparently impor-
tant to Judge Mansfield-what is shocking in Long Island may be routine in New York City.
140. Pico, 638 F.2d at 413 (quoting West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Burnette, 319
U.S. 624, 640 (1942)).
141. 638 F.2d at 413.
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seeks notice of what kind of activity and/or materials will or will
not be prohibited. While a generalized students' first amendment
rights test may not be feasible, it is essential that the courts give
students more specific and consistent guidance than presently
exists.
III. THE SEYFRIED COURTS' RELIANCE ON A COURSE CURRICULUM
THEORY
Without citing a single authority, the Seyfried courts asserted
that a school-sponsored theatrical production plays a role distin-
guishable from that of a library book or student publication." 2 By
refusing to explore any of the potential analogies, the courts ig-
nored the legal theories and tests described in the preceding two
sections of this Comment.14 3 Instead both tribunals rested their de-
cisions on the reasoning that "the selection of the artistic work to
be given in the spring production does not differ in principle from
the selection of course curriculum, a process which courts have tra-
ditionally left to the expertise of educators.' 44
The state admittedly has a compelling interest in the choice of
and adherence to a suitable curriculum for the benefit of young
people. 145 Courts have consistently acknowledged the right of
school boards "to establish and apply their curriculum in such a
way as to transmit community values.146 This right incorporates
the goals of socialization and indoctrination.
47
Notwithstanding the validity of the above principles, the cur-
142. 512 F. Supp. at 238. See also 668 F.2d at 216.
143. Even defendants-appellees in Seyfried begged the analogies, relying on Zykan and
Williams as precedent. See Brief for Appellees, supra note 132, at 14.
144. 512 F. Supp. at 238-39; 668 F.2d at 216.
145. See Palmer v. Board of Educ. of the City of Chicago, 603 F.2d 1271, 1274 (7th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1026 (1980).
This interest is often incorporated into state statutes. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit.14, §
1043 (1981) (extending to school officials the authority to determine the educational policy
of the district, to prescribe rules and regulations for the conduct and management of the
schools, and to select text books and other instructional materials). See also Brief for Appel-
lees, supra note 132, at 13.
Even pro-students' rights jurisdictions have not questioned the authority of a school
board to determine course content within reasonable bounds. See, e.g., Gambino, 429 F.
Supp. at 736.
146. Pico, 102 S. Ct. at 2806.
147. See Stern, supra note 60, at 493; Project, Education and the Law: State Interests
and Individual Rights, 74 MICH. L. Rav. 1373, 1424 (1976).
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riculum argument set forth by the Seyfried courts proceeded on
two erroneous assumptions. First, the courts incorrectly implied
that the authority of school officials in this realm is unqualified. 148
This stance ignores the well-established principle that discretion
over curriculum is subject to constitutional limitations. 149 For ex-
ample, in a series of cases involving teacher dismissal over the use
of controversial classroom materials, 150 courts advanced the pro-
position that judicial deference to school board curricular determi-
nations should not serve as a "euphemism . . . for 'infringement
upon' and 'deprivations of' constitutional rights." '' While the
facts in Seyfried are partially distinguishable from those in the
teacher dismissal cases, one passage found in the latter line of
cases is especially pertinent here: "[H]aving granted both teachers
and students the freedom to explore contemporary literature in
these high school classes [elective courses], the school board may
not impose its value judgments on the literature they choose to
consider. 1152 This statement can readily be applied to the privilege
of students and teachers to choose and perform a school play.
A recent Eighth Circuit decision'5 3 has further established
that even where school authorities take action against a work
which is undeniably a part of the school's curriculum, such as a
148. Both the district court and the court of appeals invoked the principle established
in Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968), that courts "cannot intervene in the reso-
lution of conflicts which arise in the daily operation of school systems." 668 F.2d at 217, 512
F. Supp. at 236. By characterizing the controversy surrounding a severe infringement upon
pure speech as "nothing more than differing judgments on the extent to which certain as-
pects of human sexuality should be represented on stage by high school students," (512 F.
Supp. at 239, reasoning implicitly adopted by court of appeals), the district court introduced
an exceedingly broad concept of what constitutes an "everyday conflict." Under such an
approach, the actions of school boards would almost never be reviewable by courts.
149. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 343 U.S. 97, 107 (1968).
150. Cory v. Board of Educ., 427 F. Supp. 945 (D. Colo. 1977); Parducci v. Rutland, 316
F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970); Parker v. Board of Educ., 237 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md.), aff'd
348 F.2d 464 (4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1030 (1966). In Cory, the court held for
the school board, but solely on the basis of a collective bargaining agreement wherein the
teachers "voluntarily submitted themselves to the employer-employee mode of the teacher's
relation to the school board." The court stated, "[blut for the bargained agreement, the
plaintiffs would prevail here. The selection of the subject books as material for these elective
courses. . . is clearly within the protected area recognized as of academic freedom." 427 F.
Supp. at 955.
151. Parducci, 316 F. Supp. at 357.
152. Cory, 427 F. Supp. at 953.
153. Pratt v. Independent School Dist. No. 831, Forest Lake, Minn., 670 F.2d 771 (8th
Cir. 1982).
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film shown in class, courts should not be totally unwilling to ex-
plore the validity of the authorities' explanation for their actions.
In that particular case, a Minnesota school board had banned from
the classroom a short motion picture, purportedly because of its
violent content. While recognizing the power of the board to make
such a decision, the court examined both the film itself and the
circumstances surrounding its removal, and concluded that the "vi-
olence" justification was simply a cover for the board members' de-
sire to prevent dissemination of the ideological and religious
themes contained in the work.1 54
In Seyfried, the superintendent similarly offered a superfi-
cially legitimate reason for his suppression of Pippin, i.e., the
play's "sexual theme."155 Neither the district court nor the court of
appeals felt it necessary to seriously question or explore the factual
validity of the proffered defense. This casual acceptance of the de-
fendant's explanation is disturbing, in light of the relative tame-
ness of the theater director's modified version of the musical, and
also in light of evidence that at least one other school official had
objected to the work's religious themes.15
Even were it found that Pippin was cancelled solely on the
grounds of its sexual content, a principal inquiry remains whether
a school play actually constitutes curriculum. 157 Scrutiny of rele-
vant authority strongly indicates that the Seyfried courts erred
significantly in so characterizing the production. One court has ex-
plicitly identified a school theatrical production as "an extracurric-
ular activity."158 On appeal, the Seyfried plaintiffs-appellants ve-
154. Id. at 778-79.
155. 668 F.2d at 215.
156. Id. Pippin, with its dark humor and general cynical view of human nature, also
contains ideological themes which conservative school officials may have been eager to
suppress.
157. In WEBsTsr'S NEW WORLD DICTIoNARY OF THE AMERIcAN LANGUAGE 348 (2d Coil.
Ed. 1970), "curriculum" is defined as:
1) a fixed series of studies required, as in a college, for graduation, qualification
in a major field of study .. .; 2) all of the courses collectively, offered in a school,
college . . . or in a particular subject."
Id.
While the fact-that a school theatrical production does not fit comfortably into either of
these descriptions is not determinative of the issue, the dictionary definition may carry
some weight when read in conjunction with cases which characterize activities such as school
plays as extracurricular.
158. Playcrafters v. Teaneck Township Bd. of Educ., 177 N.J. Super. 66, 76, aff'd, 88
N.J. 74 (1981). But see Webb v. Lake Mills Community School Dist., 344 F. Supp. 791 (N.D.
1982] 575
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hemently argued with the lower court's analogy of the production
of Pippin to course material, 159 emphasizing that the district offi-
cials delegated the authority for selection and staging of a play to
the drama director by contract, unlike the procedure for curricu-
lum development.""0
The curriculum issue may be clarified by comparing the school
play situation to the library book and student publication exam-
ples, an approach which the Third Circuit unwisely failed to pur-
sue. In general, a school play has much in common with a school
newspaper, which is universally deemed an extracurricular activ-
ity.18 1 Both are essentially designed as forums for the expression of
the student. The Seyfried district court's dismissal of student pub-
lications as "non-program related expressions of student opin-
ion ' 162 provides several mythical distinctions. For example, partic-
ular emphasis was placed upon the play's role in the school's
educational program:
Like elective courses, the spring production is designed to provide an educa-
tional experience for those who choose to participate .... [T]here is, in addi-
tion, a direct tie to course curriculum. [The drama director] teaches a course
Iowa 1972) (however this case involved an Iowa statute which characterized drama coaching
as a classroom activity).
159. The appellants protested that "[i]t was a misconstruction of the facts in this case
to assert that the high school play at issue here was really a question very similar to curricu-
lum selection." Reply Brief, supra note 65, at 6.
160. Specifically, the appellants asserted:
[N]ot only had the decision been made by the school district to sponsor high
school theatrical productions, but a faculty member was given a written contract
to undertake that responsibility. In this manner the... District officials did
delegate their authority for the selection and production of a dramatic work to
an employee of the district. Such a circumstance is much different from the de-
termination of appropriate curriculum for a high school. The reason for this is
that the decision has already been made to sponsor theatrical productions and
the final choice of the exact production to be presented is delegated to a faculty
member.
Id. at 11. The appellants further argued: "When the District officials consciously chose to
delegate their responsibility, then the authority for the selection of the dramatic production
has, thereafter, been vested in the delegee. This is a very different situation from where the
District authorities have maintained control at each point in the selection process." Id. at
12.
Compare the library book situation, where a certain amount of discretion is often dele-
gated to the school librarian as to choice of books.
161. See Gambino, 429 F. Supp. at 736. In Gambino, the court noted that "the newspa-
per cannot be construed objectively as an integral part of the curriculum." Id. at 734. The
court then refused to characterize the paper as an "in-house organ of the school system." Id.
162. 512 F. Supp. at 238.
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in theatre arts and students in that course are given credit for participation
in one of the two dramatic productions of the year.'
One may easily draw analogies to the student press cases from this
passage, although the Seyfried courts declined to do so. Certainly,
few would deny that a student newspaper is also intended to pro-
vide an educational experience for the individuals who work on it.
Moreover, the fact that some students may receive course credit
does not strip an activity of its extracurricular nature. One court
examined a school newspaper whose staff included credit-earning
members of a journalism class and explicitly found the paper to be
"not... part of the curriculum."!" Finally, the "opinion" distinc-
tion suggested in Seyfried is also not especially viable. Many arti-
cles and features which school officials have found objectionable
cannot validly be classified as student opinion.6 5
Invocation of the "curriculum control" theory has generally
been confined to cases involving materials and activities within the
classroom walls.166 If, as the Seyfried courts asserted, the purpose
of regulating curriculum is "to best. . . achieve the goals of edu-
163. Id.
164. Gambino, 429 F. Supp. at 736. The Virginia District Court elaborated that, "[t]he
[newspaper] is a student activity. Some staff members are enrolled in Journalism and re-
ceive academic credit for their work on the paper ... Other staff members work on the
paper as an extracurricular activity." Id. at 733.
165. E.g., in Jacobs, school authorities attempted to restrain distribution of the student
Corn Cob Curtain newspaper because it included "[a] few earthy words relating to bodily
functions and sexual intercourse," and "[a] cartoon [which] depicts a sequence of incidents
in a bathroom." 490 F.2d at 610.
166. Most of these cases have involved either constitutional challenges to a school
board's choice of materials to be used in the classroom, see, e.g., Pico, 638 F.2d 404; Palmer
v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago, 603 F.2d 1271, 1274 (7th Cir. 1979); see also Brubaker
v. Board of Educ., 502 F.2d 973 (7th Cir. 1974); or teacher discussions of controversial topics
or use/encouragement of obscenity in the classroom. See, e.g., Mailloux v. Kiley, 448 F.2d
1242 (1st Cir. 1971); Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969); Sterzing v. Fort Bend
Indep. School Dist., 376 F. Supp. 657 (S.D. Tex. 1972), vacated and remanded, 496 F.2d 92
(5th Cir. 1974). See generally Stern, supra note 60, at 489.
While several courts and commentators have classified library books as curriculum, see,
e.g., Pico, 638 F.2d at 419; Zykan, 631 F.2d at 1302; Note, supra note 79, at 1052, this
position was expressly rejected by Justice Brennan in the Supreme Court's Pico decision:
Respondents do not seek in this Court to impose limitations upon their school
board's discretion to prescribe the curricula of the Island Trees schools. On the
contrary, the only books at issue in this case are library books, books that by
their nature are optional rather than required reading. Our adjudication of the
present case thus does not intrude into the classroom, or into the compulsory
courses taught there.
102 S. Ct. at 2805.
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cating and socializing ... students" given limited resources,16 7 it is
difficult to perceive how this purpose would be furthered by ban-
ning a volunteer student activity. In his Pico plurality opinion,
Justice Brennan emphasized this mandatory/optional distinction:
Petitioners might well defend their claim of absolute discretion in matters of
curriculum by reliance upon their duty to inculcate community values. But
we think that petitioners' reliance upon that duty is misplaced where, as
here, they attempt to extend their claim of absolute discretion beyond the
compulsory environment of the classroom, into the school library and the re-
gime of voluntary inquiry that there holds sway.'"8
Extracurricular activities are often designed to provide an alterna-
tive educational experience, allowing a student the opportunity to
escape the restrictive atmosphere of the classroom. Therefore, it
defies logic to apply a broad "curricular control" theory to such
activities.
CONCLUSION
The district court and court of appeals unquestionably faced a
dilemma in Seyfried, where, supplied with an arsenal of broad,
contradictory, and not entirely on-point case law, they faced a
novel students' rights issue. Such circumstances, however, do not
justify their ill-advised reliance on a "course curriculum" theory to
decide the case,16 9 which not only enabled them to reason out the
167. 512 F. Supp. at 237. See 668 F.2d at 216-17.
168. 102 S. Ct. at 2809. Justice Brennan stressed "the unique role of the school li-
brary," stating, "[i]t appears from the record that use of the ... school libraries is com-
pletely voluntary on the part of students. Their selection of books from these libraries is
entirely a matter of free choice; the libraries afford them an opportunity at self-education
and individual enrichment that is wholly optional." Id.
169. As a corollary to its "curriculum" argument, the Seyfried courts make one valid
point when they reason:
[The play] is an activity sponsored by the school for the viewing of the school
community. For this reason, there is a far greater risk than in the area of student
protest or library bibliography that the point of view or expression found in the
play will be viewed as sanctioned or endorsed by the school as an institution.
This fact is important because "a school has an important educational interest
in avoiding the impression that it has authorized a particular expression" which
is not characteristic of its educational program.
Thomas v. Board of Educ., Granville Centennial School Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1049 (2d Cir.
1979). While this argument has some logical force, the "endorsement" theory alone cannot
justify the severe interference with student expression found in Seyfried. 512 F. Supp. at
239 (reasoning accepted by court of appeals in Seyfried v. Walton, 668 F.2d 214, 216 (3d Cir.
1981)).
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conflict with relative ease, but also established a dangerous prece-
dent. Consistent with the spirit of Seyfried, school officials in sev-
eral communities have summarily cancelled student productions,
offering such defenses as the fear of upsetting Fundamentalist
groups, 170 and the need for providing an "uplifting, cheerful, happy
entertainment experience." 171 It is not difficult to imagine numer-
ous other situations where student expression might be suppressed
under this rule. For example, the Seyfried rationale would un-
doubtedly authorize a school official to prohibit display of a stu-
dent's controversial sculpture 17 2 at a school art show held at night,
or to deny a student chorus permission to perform a mild anti-
nuclear song at an evening concert. Unfettered discretion of this
sort is not conducive to educational development. 7 3 If "course cur-
170. This defense was asserted by school administrators in Pylesville, Md. as justifica-
tion for cancelling a spring 1982 production of Inherit the Wind, by an accelerated class of
eighth.graders. The play is a dramatization of the 1925 trial of John T. Scopes, a biology
teacher who broke a Tennessee law prohibiting the teaching of evolution. In explaining their
decision to block the production, the school officials offered the following comments:
"We feel some concern about the appropriateness of the play for this age
group (13-14) .... [O]ur district is called the Bible Belt of Hartford County
and the Mason-Dixon line runs right through here."
"Fundamentalist groups ... have told us about their concerns before, and
while no group has protested about this play yet, our motto is that we do not
want any community ill-will from any program."
"In the play Inherit, the evolutionists win in the end, and some parents and
children in the community could object to that."
See Variety, Jan. 27, 1982, at 92, col. 4.
171. In March, 1980, an Anne Arundel County, Md., principal cancelled a production of
One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest, claiming the play was "not in keeping with the purposes
of a high school production to be providing wholesomeness and unoffensive entertainment
to the community." Id. at 92, col. 5.
172. See Sefick v. City of Chicago, 485 F. Supp. 644 (N.D. IM1. 1979) (for the adult law
counterpart to this situation).
173. Instead it greatly infringes upon the free exchange of ideas. The continued pres-
ence of an unedited copy of Pippin in the school library, a fact heavily stressed by both the
district court and the court of appeals, does not alleviate the infringement. In Pratt v. Inde-
pendent School Dist. No. 831, Forest Lake, Minn., 670 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1982), the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit responded to a similar situation as follows:
The board seeks to justify its action (banning a film from use in the classroom)
by pointing out that the short story (upon which the film is based) remains
available to teachers and students in the library in printed form and a photo-
graphic recording. This fact is not decisive. Restraint on protected speech gener-
ally cannot be justified by the fact that there may be other times, places or cir-
cumstances for such expression .... The symbolic effect of removing the films
from the curriculum is more significant than the resulting limitation of access to
the story. The board has used its official power to perform an act clearly indicat-
ing that the ideas contained in the films are unacceptable and should not be
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riculum" is allowed to envelop all school-related activities and
shield administrative judgment from scrutiny, students will be left
with no educational forums primarily devoted to their own
expression.
Although the library book removal cases are factually distin-
guishable from the student play situation, this circumstance did
not justify the Seyfried courts' failure to consider these cases. The
"pure speech" embodied in theatrical presentations is, if anything,
entitled to greater first amendment protection than the tangential
"right to know" involved in Minarcini and Pico. In addition, the
significant dichotomy between mandatory classroom activity and
optional pursuits outside class 174 should have been addressed by
the- Seyfried courts. This dichotomy, though not expressly or ex-
tensively cQmmented upon prior to Justice Brennan's opinion in
Pico, was implicit in many of the earlier cases.
Even more applicable to Seyfried were the decisions in other
circuits regarding student publications. Curriculum distinctions
aside, the most important similarity between Seyfried and the stu-
dent press cases is that they both involve prior restraints, a con-
cept against which there exists a strong judicial bias. Since courts
deciding students' rights cases have freely drawn support for their
arguments from adult law decisions, 7 the Seyfried courts had
solid precedent for relying upon the Conrad case, where the Su-
preme Court, viewing a situation broadly analogous to that in
Seyfried, observed, "[t]he board's judgment effectively kept the
musical off stage... . [T]hey denied the application in anticipa-
tion that the production would violate the law. ' 176 Yet not only did
the courts fail to address Conrad, they declined to even mention
discussed or considered. This message is not lost on students and teachers, and
its chilling effect is obvious.
Id. at 779 (citations omitted). As Justice Douglas, noted in Conrad, the ribald and trenchant
commentary of a play "is undoubtedly offensive to some, but its contribution to social con-
sciousness and intellectual ferment is a positive one." 420 U.S. at 564 (Douglas, J., concur-
ring and dissenting). Such educational benefits are at the heart of the "academic freedom"
espoused by the Court in Keyishian and Tinker.
174. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
175. See Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1973), which invokes such
adult prior restraint cases as Burstyn, Near, and Bantam Books to bolster its argument. Id.
at 1349, 1350.
176. Conrad, 420 U.S. at 555. In Seyfried, the superintendent's judgment effectively
kept Pippin off the stage, cancelling the production in anticipation that it would violate a
school district policy or offend the community.
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the phrase "prior restraint." Such an omission is unaccountable.
The strength of prior restraint doctrine in both the adult and stu-
dent realms compels a court facing the Seyfried facts to consider
both the Conrad opinion and the student press cases.
The better-reasoned approach to cases such as Seyfried, in-
volving extracurricular activities, is to apply three narrow tests, the
first being strict application of the substantial disruption/material
interference test. The Tinker test, when carefully applied, pro-
duces valid and concrete results.1 77 Therefore courts, in evaluating
restraints placed on extracurricular activities, should closely ex-
amine the regulation in question to determine whether it was
promulgated in response to a reasonable prediction of the occur-
rence of a disruption. Primary focus would be on the adequacy of
the procedures under which a restraint was issued. If these proce-
dures are not regular and systematic, and if they fail to provide
sufficient notice as to prohibited behavior, or fail to provide a
prompt appeals process, then the test would not be satisfied.
The second test is the health and safety test. If any particular
expression is found to seriously endanger the health and safety of
students, such as the drug advertisements/endorsements in Wil-
liams, it may be validly restrained. The defendant school officials,
however, must meet a heavy burden of proof in establishing the
actual physical threat posed by such expression.
The third test is the modified emotional harm test. The use of
the "psychological harm" criteria by the Trachtman court was
wholly inadequate. However, this author agrees with Circuit Judge
Gurfein, who, in his concurrence, asserted that "a blow to the
psyche may do more permanent damage than a blow to the
chin.111  Consequently, formation of a substantially modified emo-
tional harm test may be appropriate. Under this modified ap-
proach, there would be a heavy presumption of unconstitutionality
attached to the school officials' regulation, since mental injury is by
177. See Baughman, 478 F.2d 1345. The wisdom of using the Tinker test in school play
cases has been recognized by the hearing examiner for the Maryland State Board of Educa-
tion. Reviewing the cancellation of a high school production of One Flew Over the Cuckoo's
Nest, he held that while the play could be constitutionally banned if a production would
"substantially disrupt or materially interfere with school activities," the procedure used by
the county school board did not meet constitutional standards since there were no clear
criteria for reviewing plays and the resulting imposition of private notions of taste were
therefore constitutionally suspect. Variety, Jan. 27, 1982, at 94, col. 4.
178. 563 F.2d at 520.
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nature extremely difficult to predict. This presumption, though,
may be overcome by overwhelming evidence and the unanimous or
near-unanimous conclusion of experts that the expression in ques-
tion will indeed inflict emotional harm on students.179
These three tests would provide both school officials and stu-
dents with sufficiently tangible criteria to judge the permissible
limits of student expression. It is to be hoped that courts soon rec-
ognize the need for such criteria; otherwise, the unjustified result
in Seyfried may signal the beginning of a trend towards further
administrative and judicial limitations on the first amendment
rights of students in the 1980's.
DAVID E. LONG
179. This burden clearly would not have been met in Trachtman, where five of nine
expert witnesses denied that any psychological harm would result from distribution of the
questionnaire.
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